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Sweden is often thought of as the quintessential social welfare economy.
Due to public policies and labor market institutions, Sweden has histori-
cally had highly compressed wages and even more compressed after-tax in-
come. Despite the common assumption that there is an equality/eﬃciency
trade-oﬀ, Sweden has also had one of the highest average incomes in the
world and, until recently, very low unemployment. The period 1970 to 1990
was an interesting time for the Swedish labor market, as it generally pros-
pered but faced several challenges. This chapter uses a large matched
employee-employer data set to look at trends in the Swedish labor market
during this period.
Several important factors aﬀected the Swedish labor market system dur-
ing the 1970s and 1980s. One important change was the breakdown in the
traditionally centralized wage-bargaining system. From the 1950s through
the early 1980s, Swedish unions and employers negotiated wages at a
highly centralized level. Individual ﬁrms and unions had little leeway to
arrange speciﬁc wage agreements. However, in 1983, driven by a few ﬁrms’
inability to ﬁnd enough skilled labor at the negotiated rate, individual ﬁrms
and unions began to break away from the collective agreement. Other im-
portant changes included a weakening of the Swedish economy in the early
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for help accessing and understanding the data.1980s, a sharp increase in the use of temporary workers starting in the late
1980s, and an increase in merger and acquisition activity in the late 1980s.
As I show in the following, these factors (and possibly others) led to sev-
eral important trends in the Swedish labor market. There was a distinct de-
crease in wage inequality from 1974 through 1982, but this decrease was
almost exactly reversed by 1990. These changes in wage compression oc-
curred both within ﬁrms and across ﬁrms. As wages became more com-
pressed from 1974 through 1982, employee turnover became less common.
But turnover rates rose sharply after that and, by 1990, were signiﬁcantly
above the 1974 level. The decrease in turnover followed by an increase
holds in virtually every group I analyze—blue-collar, white-collar, high-
pay, low-pay, and so on. There is little evidence that some ﬁrms were more
aﬀected by any of these trends than other ﬁrms.
Skans, Edin, and Holmlund (chapter 7 in this volume) perform an anal-
ysis of the Swedish labor market that is similar in spirit to this chapter.
However, there are several important diﬀerences. I focus on the 1970s and
1980s, while their study covers 1985 to 2000. This enables them to look at
the 1990s which was another turbulent decade for the Swedish labor 
market, as unemployment increased dramatically. Skans, Edin, and Holm-
lund (chapter 7 in this volume) use administrative data that is more com-
prehensive than the union/employers’ federation data set I use. However, I
have more detailed information on the jobs and occupations of individual
workers. So, while both chapters use employee-employer data sets to look
at the Swedish labor market, diﬀerences in time frame and data details
make it possible to gain diﬀerent and complementary insights from the two
studies.
The rest of this chapter provides a few more details on the Swedish labor
market and then conducts formal descriptive analyses to document these
changes throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The next section provides some
institutional background. Section 12.3 describes the matched employee-
employer data set that I use. Section 12.4 contains the analysis of wage lev-
els and wage changes. Trends in worker mobility are described in section
12.5. Section 12.6 concludes and discusses how my ﬁndings might help mo-
tivate future research.
12.2 Institutional Background
During the period I study, Sweden experienced an unusually successful
mix of very high standards of living, minimal income inequality, and low
unemployment. Also during this period, the central bargaining system un-
derwent important changes with wide-ranging ramiﬁcations.1
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1. This section draws heavily from Edin and Topel (1997). See that paper, Ekberg (2004),
and Nilsson (1993) for further background.As of 1950, wage negotiations in Sweden were similar to those in the
United States. Many union groups were associated with the Swedish Trade
Union Confederation, which represented blue-collar workers, and many
employers were aﬃliated with the Swedish Employers Federation (SAF—
the group that provided the data for this study.) However, most bargaining
was done on a one employer/one union basis. Apparently at the urging of
the SAF, which wanted to avoid pattern bargaining driving wages up as one
group after another negotiated, negotiations in the 1950s became broader.
Though at ﬁrst somewhat reluctant, the union groups agreed to more
centralized bargaining by the mid-1950s as they began to more actively
seek equality and solidarity among their members. The unions were in-
spired by the work of economists Gosta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner, who ar-
gued that idiosyncrasies in wage negotiations led to pay diﬀerences be-
tween similar workers and, therefore, impeded the reallocation of jobs.
According to Edin and Topel (1997, 158–59), Rehn and Meidner’s view
promotes the belief that “there is no trade-oﬀ between equity and eﬃ-
ciency; instead, they are complements in producing greater social welfare.”
This form of bargaining is particularly important in Sweden, relative to
other countries such as the United States, because union membership rates
are very high throughout the economy. In 1960, about three-quarters of
Swedish workers belonged to unions, but that ﬁgure reached 90 percent in
1990. During the same time, labor force participation rose. While male par-
ticipation dropped slightly from 1965 to 1990 (though it was always ap-
proximately 90 percent), female participation increased from just over half
in the mid-1960s to over 80 percent by 1990. As a result of these two trends
and some population growth, union membership in Sweden nearly doubled
from 1960 to 1990. The trend toward bargaining at a higher level of aggre-
gation, therefore, led to negotiations over much bigger groups of people.
Collective bargaining in Sweden entered a new era in 1983, however,
when one large union (metalworkers) and the engineering ﬁrms’ employers’
federation bargained outside the broader collective negotiations. The ﬁrms
argued that the prior system underpaid skilled workers, making it diﬃcult
to recruit them. According to Edin and Topel (1997, 160), “a tendency to-
ward more bargaining at industry and company levels seems clear.”
12.3 Years and Data
I study the Swedish labor market between 1970 and 1990. Most of the
analysis looks at three points in time—1974, 1982, and 1990. Table 12.1
provides basic information about the macroeconomic situation in Sweden
in the period surrounding each of those years, while ﬁgures 12.1 to 12.3
plot similar data for the entire 1970 to 1990 period. Figure 12.1 shows un-
employment. As the graph makes clear, unemployment was quite low in
Sweden during this period, peaking at approximately 4 percent. During
Wage Structure and Labor Mobility in Sweden, 1970–90 421the late 1980s, unemployment dipped under 2 percent, suggesting this was
a favorable period for employees. Figure 12.2 plots annual gross domestic
product (GDP) growth and ﬁgure 12.3 shows per capita GDP in constant
dollar terms. These plots show that, though the annual growth rate varied
considerably from year to year, there were no long boom or bust periods dur-
ing the 1970s or 1980s in Sweden, and income grew fairly consistently. The
low unemployment, steady growth, and increasing labor force participa-
tion in Sweden is quite remarkable, especially given that tax rates (espe-
cially payroll taxes) increased signiﬁcantly during the 1970s and 1980s
(Edin and Topel 1997.)
The employment data were provided by the Swedish Employers’ Fed-
eration (SAF). The SAF assembles detailed and uniform data from
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Table 12.1 Macroeconomic conditions
1970 1973 1974 1981 1982 1989 1990
Unemployment 1.5 2.5 2.0 2.8 3.5 1.6 1.8
GDP per person (1995 US$) 19,269 20,446 21,038 22,570 22,820 27,166 27,252
Change in GDP (%)
1 year (total) 6.47 3.97 3.20 –0.17 1.17 2.69 1.10
2 year (total) 11.81 6.35 7.29 1.50 1.00 5.34 3.81
5 year (total) 22.28 20.03 17.96 5.53 8.50 14.29 13.08
1 year (per capita) 5.48 3.78 2.89 –0.29 1.11 2.00 0.32
2 year (per capita) 10.01 5.84 6.78 1.18 0.82 4.18 2.32
5 year (per capita) 17.58 16.74 15.17 4.29 7.55 12.19 10.32
Fig. 12.1 Swedish unemploymentFig. 12.2 Swedish GDP growth
Fig. 12.3 Swedish per capita GDPestablishment-level personnel records.2 The ﬁrms span virtually every
private-sector industry (with the exception of ﬁnancial services). The data
are used for wage negotiations and are monitored by employers and labor
unions, which ensures a high level of accuracy. Ekberg (2004) discusses
some potential measurement issues with the data that are driven by timing
of negotiations and other issues. I chose 1974, 1982, and 1990 for the anal-
ysis partially because these problems are minimized in these years. For ex-
ample, negotiations stalled in 1980, so data from that year did not reﬂect all
raises agreed to during the year. If I used 1980 or 1981 as one of the key years,
wages or wage changes would not properly reﬂect labor market conditions.
Some complication is created by the fact that white-collar and blue-collar
workers are in separate data sets, and there is no way to match ﬁrms across
the two groups. As a result, if a ﬁrm has a group of white-collar workers and
a group of blue-collar workers, I cannot join them together to analyze char-
acteristics of the ﬁrm as a whole. It is clearly not perfectly accurate to treat
groups of white-collar workers at a single ﬁrm or groups of blue-collar
workers at a single ﬁrm as whole ﬁrms. However, due to the fact that ﬁrms
are not matched across the data and that there are diﬀerences in the two
data sets in how some variables are deﬁned, I must redeﬁne a “ﬁrm” as the
white-collar workers within a company or the blue-collar workers within a
company.3
There are far more blue-collar ﬁrms than white-collar ﬁrms in most in-
dustry/year combinations. One reason for this is that the white-collar data
do not include the chief executive oﬃcer (CEO) and other members of the
executive team who negotiate their own wages rather than letting a union
negotiate on their behalf. At some ﬁrms, there is just a small set of such
workers, and the rest of the employees are blue collar. The deﬁnition of a
ﬁrm as the blue-collar workers at a company is, therefore, approximately
accurate for many of the blue-collar “ﬁrms.”
The two data sets contain a wealth of other information. The other vari-
ables that I use here include occupation, age, and wages. I use actual wages
paid as the primary wage measure and then put this into monthly units.
Though the data are generally highly accurate, I minimize the eﬀect of data
entry errors or other problems by dropping the highest and lowest 0.5 per-
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2. See Meyersson Milgrom, Petersen, and Snartland (2001) and Ekberg (2004) for further
details about the SAF data.
3. In an earlier version of this chapter, I attempted to form groups approximating actual
whole ﬁrms by merging ﬁrms from each of the two data sets. In each year, I ranked ﬁrms
within an industry from largest to smallest in both the blue-collar and white-collar data sets.
Then I assumed that the ﬁrm with the largest set of blue-collar workers in a given year and in
a given industry is the same as the ﬁrm with the largest set of white-collar workers in that in-
dustry and year. I matched the second largest, the third largest, and so on. I subsequently
learned that, in order to insure data integrity, the SAF prohibits the merging of the two data
sets. Note, however, that conclusions based on the “merged” data set were similar to those I
draw in this version of the chapter.cent of wage observations each year for both the blue-collar and white-
collar samples.
Firms enter and exit the data set throughout the whole period studied.
Tenure calculations are limited by the entry of individual ﬁrms. For ex-
ample, some of the analyses look at workers who have been at their ﬁrm at
least three years. These analyses in, for example, 1982 are limited to ﬁrms
that had entered the data by 1979 because, for ﬁrms that entered the data
after 1979, it is impossible to determine which workers had been at the ﬁrm
for at least three years as of 1982.
Occupations in both data sets are determined by a detailed set of codes
that are part of the Swedish occupational coding system. When I look at
“levels” within ﬁrms, I look only at the white-collar employees and use the
last digit of their occupation code (also known as the BNT code). This digit
can take one of seven values, each of which indicates a diﬀerent level of re-
sponsibility and skill. Within occupations, this precisely identiﬁes the rel-
ative level of a job (see Lazear and Oyer [2004] for examples of job classi-
ﬁcations). While these levels are not meant to be comparable across
occupations, I use the number of relative levels as a rough gauge for the
range of the hierarchy of individual ﬁrms.
As the kernel density estimates in the top of ﬁgure 12.4 suggest, most
ﬁrms and plants are quite small (though most employees work in fairly
large plants and ﬁrms). For the rest of this chapter, I restrict the sample to
ﬁrm-year observations with at least twenty-ﬁve employees. As the bottom
of ﬁgure 12.4 shows, most of these ﬁrms are near the twenty-ﬁve employee
cutoﬀ. However, the average ﬁrm in the sample has roughly 100 employees.
Much of the analysis further restricts the sample to ﬁrms with 100 or more
workers. Keep in mind that, in this restriction and throughout the whole
chapter, the term “ﬁrm” actually means the white-collar workers at a com-
pany or the blue-collar workers at a company.
12.4 Wage Structure
Table 12.2 provides numerous details about wages at Swedish ﬁrms in
1974, 1982, and 1990. The top panel of table 12.2 provides these details for
blue-collar ﬁrms, and the bottom panel of table 12.2 provides analogous
information for white-collar ﬁrms. Before getting to the wage changes,
note the changes in composition of the labor force. The number of blue-
collar workers at ﬁrms with at least twenty-ﬁve workers who meet the hours
restriction fell throughout the period, with a particularly large drop from
1974 to 1982. The number of workers in the blue-collar sample shrank by
about one-sixth from 1974 to 1982. Some of this reduction is because work-
ers move to the white-collar sector, but that only explains a small fraction
of the blue-collar reduction. Given that the total number of workers rose
steadily in Sweden, this reduction suggests some combination of ﬁrms
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25 or more employees
A
BTable 12.2 Structure of wages within and between ﬁrms
Log monthly wages 
Wages in 1990 kroners in 1990 kroners
1974 1982 1990 1974 1982 1990
Blue-collar workers
Average wagea 9,860 9,526 10,571 9.16 9.13 9.23
SD 2,546 2,184 2,690 0.27 0.24 0.26
90th percentile 13,088 12,281 14,041 9.48 9.42 9.55
10th percentile 6,589 6,628 7,223 8.79 8.80 8.88
No. of workers 474,857 396,701 372,623
Average of ﬁrm average wageb
(weight observations 
diﬀerent from previous row) 9,636 9,221 10,176 9.14 9.10 9.19
SD 1,514 1,310 1,664 0.16 0.14 0.16
90th percentile 11,619 10,908 12,400 9.33 9.28 9.40
10th percentile 7,686 7,552 8,140 8.92 8.91 8.98
No. of ﬁrms 3,708 3,546 3,931
Average of SD of wageb 1,988 1,723 2,112 0.22 0.20 0.21
SD 587 465 656 0.053 0.044 0.051
90th percentile 2,785 2,339 3,012 0.28 0.25 0.28
10th percentile 1,306 1,171 1,366 0.15 0.14 0.15
No. of ﬁrms 3,705 3,546 3,930
Average CV of wagesb 0.207 0.188 0.207 0.024 0.021 0.023
SD 0.052 0.046 0.054 0.006 0.005 0.006
90th percentile 0.273 0.247 0.276 0.031 0.028 0.030
10th percentile 0.144 0.133 0.145 0.017 0.015 0.017
No. of ﬁrms 3,705 3,546 3,930
Correlation (average wage, 
SD of wage)b 0.523 0.443 0.561 –0.004 –0.066 0.082
Average of ﬁrm average wagec 9,636 9,227 10,192 9.14 9.10 9.19
SD 1,632 1,381 1,706 0.17 0.15 0.16
90th percentile 11,881 11,105 12,558 9.35 9.29 9.41
10th percentile 7,432 7,371 8,059 8.89 8.88 8.97
No. of plants 4,832 4,526 4,866
Average of SD of wagec 1,969 1,717 2,103 0.22 0.19 0.21
SD 597 471 663 0.052 0.044 0.051
90th percentile 3,044 2,538 3,163 0.31 0.27 0.30
10th percentile 1,308 1,173 1,373 0.16 0.14 0.15
No. of plants 4,826 4,526 4,865
Average CV of wagesc 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.024 0.021 0.023
SD 0.05 0.05 0.053 0.006 0.005 0.006
90th percentile 0.29 0.26 0.29 0.034 0.029 0.032
10th percentile 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.017 0.016 0.017
No. of plants 4,826 4,526 4,865
Correlation (average wage, 
SD of wage)b 0.562 0.485 0.582 0.035 –0.022 0.110
Average wage for workers 
between 25 and 30a 10,129 9,587 10,642 9.19 9.14 9.24
(continued)SD 2,474 2,086 2,671 0.25 0.22 0.25
90th percentile 13,261 12,235 14,143 9.49 9.41 9.56
10th percentile 7,010 6,901 7,373 8.86 8.84 8.91
No. of workers 67,765 55,204 54,590
Average wage for workers 
between 45 and 50a 10,065 9,797 11,020 9.18 9.16 9.28
SD 2,583 2,207 2,707 0.26 0.23 0.25
90th percentile 13,334 12,545 14,511 9.50 9.44 9.58
10th percentile 6,721 6,817 7,639 8.81 8.83 8.94
No. of workers 43,599 35,964 39,175
White-collar workers
Average wagea 16,199 14,828 15,990 9.64 9.56 9.63
SD 5,735 4,739 5,435 0.33 0.29 0.31
90th percentile 23,935 21,302 23,475 10.08 9.97 10.06
10th percentile 10,145 9,903 10,400 9.22 9.20 9.25
No. of workers 267,293 277,491 296,778
Average of ﬁrm average wageb
(weight observations 
diﬀerent from previous row) 15,445 14,374 15,660 9.59 9.53 9.61
SD 1,787 1,581 1,908 0.11 0.11 0.12
90th percentile 17,654 16,288 17,970 9.73 9.66 9.75
10th percentile 13,187 12,407 13,329 9.44 9.39 9.46
No. of ﬁrms 1,701 2,069 2,493
Average of SD of wageb 5,066 4,161 4,895 0.31 0.27 0.29
SD 1,141 1,035 1,164 0.050 0.048 0.049
90th percentile 6,516 5,469 6,335 0.37 0.30 0.35
10th percentile 3,584 2,809 3,393 0.25 0.20 0.23
No. of ﬁrms 1,701 2,069 2,493
Average CV of wagesb 0.327 0.287 0.311 0.032 0.028 0.030
SD 0.058 0.056 0.058 0.005 0.005 0.005
90th percentile 0.400 0.357 0.382 0.039 0.034 0.036
10th percentile 0.253 0.211 0.235 0.026 0.021 0.024
No. of ﬁrms 1,701 2,069 2,493
Correlation (average wage, 
SD of wage)b 0.641 0.689 0.657 0.136 0.360 0.308
Average of ﬁrm average wagec 15,701 14,500 15,714 9.60 9.54 9.61
SD 2,017 1,675 2,020 0.12 0.11 0.12
90th percentile 18,358 16,810 18,611 9.76 9.68 9.77
10th percentile 13,132 12,305 13,187 9.43 9.38 9.44
No. of plants 2,358 2,752 2,956
Average of SD of wagec 5,142 4,184 4,926 0.31 0.27 0.29
SD 1,167 1,079 1,205 0.052 0.051 0.051
90th percentile 7,314 6,026 7,061 0.40 0.34 0.37
10th percentile 3,699 2,828 3,365 0.25 0.20 0.23
No. of plants 2,358 2,751 2,956
Table 12.2 (continued)
Log monthly wages 
Wages in 1990 kroners in 1990 kroners
1974 1982 1990 1974 1982 1990getting smaller (and falling below the twenty-ﬁve-person ﬂoor), people
moving to part-time work, and movement to the public sector (and, there-
fore, out of the SAF data.)
The ﬁrst line of both panels shows that real wages dropped between 1974
and 1982 in this sample and then rose during the next decade. From 1974
to 1982, as bargaining remained highly centralized, wages continued to be-
come more compressed. As a result, the accompanying reduction in real
wages was felt largely by higher-income workers. This compressing of
wages can be seen looking both between the two sectors and within each
sector. Average white-collar wages dropped 8.5 percent, while blue-collar
wages dropped only 3.4 percent, making blue- and white-collar wages less
diﬀerentiated from one another. The wage drops were larger at the 90th
percentile of each group (6.2 percent for blue-collar and 10.0 percent for
white-collar) and smaller at the 10th percentile (an increase of 0.6 per-
cent for blue-collar and a decrease of 2.4 percent for white-collar.) The
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Average CV of wagec 0.33 0.29 0.31 0.032 0.028 0.030
SD 0.06 0.06 0.061 0.005 0.005 0.005
90th percentile 0.43 0.38 0.42 0.041 0.036 0.038
10th percentile 0.26 0.21 0.24 0.026 0.021 0.024
No. of plants 2,358 2,751 2,956
Correlation (average wage, 
SD of wage)c 0.610 0.646 0.623 0.059 0.277 0.243
Average wage for workers 
between 25 and 30a 13,060 11,897 13,244 9.46 9.37 9.47
SD 2,750 2,233 2,813 0.20 0.18 0.20
90th percentile 16,533 14,599 16,787 9.71 9.59 9.73
10th percentile 9,957 9,391 10,100 9.21 9.15 9.22
No. of workers 41,574 28,552 37,423
Average wage for workers 
between 45 and 50a 18,244 16,183 17,699 9.76 9.65 9.73
SD 6,155 5,059 5,948 0.31 0.29 0.32
90th percentile 27,053 23,393 26,395 10.21 10.06 10.18
10th percentile 11,986 11,014 11,500 9.39 9.31 9.35
No. of workers 29,679 31,861 46,722
Notes:All values are kroners per month, set to 1990 values using the Swedish CPI. Data include full time
and part time, men and women, no age restrictions. Only ﬁrms with twenty-ﬁve or more employees in
the relevant year are included. SD   standard deviation; CV   coeﬃcient of variation.
aObservation   a person.
bObservation   a ﬁrm.
cObservation   a plant.
Table 12.2 (continued)
Log monthly wages 
Wages in 1990 kroners in 1990 kroners
1974 1982 1990 1974 1982 1990compression in this period can also be seen in the reduction in standard de-
viation of log wages in both samples.
It appears that the relatively slow growth in the 1970s demonstrated in
ﬁgures 12.2 and 12.3 actually led to lower real wages. Per capita wages con-
ditional on working went down, while countrywide per capita income went
up slightly. The diﬀerence is due to the increase in women’s labor partici-
pation rates during this period, from about 60 percent to nearly 80 percent.
The period between 1982 and 1990 is somewhat diﬀerent, however, as
the centralized bargaining system broke down. Economic growth was
fairly consistent in this period, and average wages increased considerably
(by 11 percent for blue-collar workers and nearly 8 percent for white-collar
workers). As would be expected given the more localized bargaining, wage
variation increased slightly, as evidenced by the mild increase in the vari-
ance of log wages and by the fact that the wage growth at the 90th per-
centile of the distribution was stronger than at the 10th percentile. The bot-
tom two rows of table 12.2 show that these conclusions largely hold for
younger workers (between ages twenty-ﬁve and thirty) and older workers
(forty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-ﬁve). One age-speciﬁc result worth noting is that the
drop in wages during the 1970s was particularly large for younger workers.
The second set of entries shows that most of the same trends that hold at
the individual level hold when using a ﬁrm and its average wages as an ob-
servation. Average wages decreased from 1974 to 1982 and increased after
that through 1990. Wages became more compressed within ﬁrms during
the ﬁrst period and less compressed during the 1980s. Average ﬁrm wages
also became more compressed initially and then less compressed. This sug-
gests that the decrease in wage variation during the 1970s and the increase
in the 1980s were due to increased variation of wages within ﬁrms and in-
creased variation acrossﬁrms. Both the standard deviation of wages within
ﬁrms and ﬁrms’ coeﬃcients of variation decreased during the 1970s and
then increased during the 1980s. This was true for the average ﬁrm, as well
as ﬁrms at the high and low ends of the distributions of these measures.
Figures 12.4 and 12.5, each of which has a blue-collar and a white-collar
portion, graphically capture these changes in wage policies across ﬁrms.
Figure 12.5 shows kernel density estimates of ﬁrm average wages in each of
the three years captured in table 12.2. That is, it maps an estimate of the
probability density function of average wage for a ﬁrm. The distribution
moves to the left (as wages decrease) and gets more compressed between
1974 and 1982. However, the pattern is exactly reversed by 1990. In fact, the
1974 and 1990 densities look remarkably similar, though the 1990 density
is shifted considerably to the right due to the wage growth of the 1980s.
Figure 12.6 shows a similar pattern for ﬁrm standard deviation of wages.
The distribution moves to the left and compresses from 1974 to 1982 as
wages get more compressed within most ﬁrms. Then the distribution re-
verts to roughly its 1974 shape by 1990.
430 Paul OyerA
B
Fig. 12.5 Kernel density of ﬁrm average wage: A, Blue-collar ﬁrms; B, White-
collar ﬁrmsA
B
Fig. 12.6 Kernel density of ﬁrm standard deviation of wage: A, Blue-collar ﬁrms;
B, White-collar ﬁrmsThe top panel of table 12.2 shows that high-wage blue-collar ﬁrms have
high variance. In levels, this relationship is strong in 1974, but gets weaker
as wages compress by 1982. By 1990, wages and variance are once again
highly correlated. This is to be expected as similar proportional diﬀerences
in pay would lead to larger pay variance at higher pay levels. The fact that
there is some positive correlation between log wages and variation of log
wages by 1990 suggests that high-wage ﬁrms really are high-variance ﬁrms
and that this relationship got stronger throughout the period. These corre-
lations average a similar magnitude in the white-collar data, but there is no
clear trend or connection to wage compression.
Finally, table 12.2 includes a summary of plant-level wages and wage
variation. Similar to ﬁrms, a “plant” is actually the blue-collar workers in
an establishment or the white-collar workers in an establishment. I only in-
clude plants with at least twenty-ﬁve employees. The results suggest that
basically all ﬁrm-level conclusions hold for plants as well, so it appears that
much of the change in variation over the sample period took place within
individual plants. In fact, the results are so similar for the plant-level and
ﬁrm-level analyses that it seems each plant (or at least the blue- or white-
collar group in the plant) is a microcosm of the ﬁrm as a whole. There is as
much variation within a typical plant as there is in a whole ﬁrm.
Figure 12.7 provides some basic information on what determines the
variation between workers in wages. The ﬁgure displays the results of anal-
ysis of variance (ANOVA) for each type of worker (that is, blue-collar or
white-collar) in each of the three years. The analysis runs a regression of
log wage on indicator variables for individual ﬁrms, industry, occupation,
age, and city. The graph displays the portion of the variance that the
ANOVA attributes to each set of indicator variables.
For blue-collar workers, the ﬁrm eﬀects are quite important, explaining
9 to 14 percent of the cross-sectional variation in wages. Occupation eﬀects
are somewhat more important than ﬁrm eﬀects, explaining as much as 
19 percent of the variation in wages. Age eﬀects explain a small amount of
the variation, while industry and location do not have any economically
meaningful eﬀect on blue-collar wages. The total R-squared statistics of
the blue-collar regressions are generally about 40 percent.4 However, the 
R-squared increases to about 60 percent when using hourly wages because
a considerable amount of the monthly wage variation is due to diﬀerences
in hours worked. It appears that, despite the centralized bargaining sys-
tem, there is considerable variation in blue-collar pay rates across ﬁrms.
The lower graph in ﬁgure 12.7 suggests that centralized bargaining is
more important in determining white-collar wages, however. While ﬁrm
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4. Note that the R-squared is not simply 1 minus the variance not assigned to any speciﬁc
variable because the ANOVA model does not necessarily assign all the variance that can be
explained by a combination of the variables to individual variables.Fig. 12.7 Analysis of variance of log wages: A, Blue-collar workers; B, White-
collar workers
A
Beﬀects are also important for white-collar workers, the magnitude of the oc-
cupation eﬀects is quite dramatic. Roughly half the cross-sectional variation
in white-collar wages can be explained by the 285 occupation classiﬁcations.
Even though the collective bargaining system became more decentralized
in the late 1980s, these occupation eﬀects were still very strong in 1990.
Table 12.3 looks at wage changes in 1974, 1982, and 1990, with the top
panel again covering blue-collar workers and the bottom panel covering
white-collar workers. This table is based on calculating each individual
worker’s wage in the appropriate year minus his or her wage in the preced-
ing year. The ﬁrst row of the bottom panel shows that a substantial portion
of the reduction in white-collar wages from 1974 to 1982 was due to a drop
in the last year of this period. There were some signiﬁcant real wage re-
ductions in 1982. As wages got more variable after 1982, there continued
to be greater variance in wage changes, and there were many real wage cuts
again in 1990. This reﬂects the fact that the Swedish economy began a re-
cession during 1990. The similarity between individual and ﬁrm-average
wage changes suggests that there is a signiﬁcant ﬁrm-speciﬁc component
in short-term wage changes. This is consistent with the ﬁndings in Lazear
and Oyer (2004), who used the white-collar SAF data to show that ﬁrm
fixed eﬀects can explain a substantial portion of year-to-year wage changes,
but do not have a large eﬀect on overall wage levels.
In both the blue-collar and white-collar panels, wage changes are diﬀer-
ent for the sample of people who change ﬁrms (and who I am able to fol-
low between ﬁrms.) They have higher wage change, on average, suggesting
that these changes are typically voluntary movement to increase wages.
They are more extreme than the wage changes of stayers on the high end of
the distribution and somewhat higher throughout the rest of the distribu-
tion. This suggests, as one might expect under this compressed system
where it is diﬃcult to ﬁre unproductive workers, that some very productive
workers get hired away at considerably higher wages.
The diﬀerence in wage changes by age operate in the direction one might
expect, but the age diﬀerences are surprisingly small. Young workers (age
twenty-ﬁve to thirty) get larger wage increases than other workers, but not
by much. For blue-collar workers, the diﬀerences in wage changes for young
workers, older workers (age forty-ﬁve to ﬁfty), and all others are trivial.
Though somewhat larger than the blue-collar age diﬀerences, the diﬀer-
ences among white-collar workers are also small. For example, in 1990, the
average real wage change for the sample as a whole and for older workers is
negative (though very small). The average change for young workers is
about 2 percent.
Diﬀerences in wage changes are also surprisingly small when looking at
short-tenured and long-tenured workers. Higher-tenured workers gener-
ally get slightly smaller wage increases than low-tenured workers. As ex-
pected, relatively new workers seem to have larger productivity gains and,
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Change in wages Change in log monthly wages
1974 1982 1990 1974 1982 1990
Blue-collar workers
Average change in wagea 7 –42 –151 0.004 –0.002 –0.011
SD 2,198 1,881 2,446 0.22 0.19 0.22
90th percentile 2,492 2,148 2,721 0.25 0.23 0.26
10th percentile –1,104 –2,234 –2,883 –0.25 –0.23 –0.27
No. of workers 294,978 306,686 237,178
Average of ﬁrm average 
change in wageb 26 –97 –147 0.010 –0.007 –0.011
SD 1,118 977 1,371 0.11 0.098 0.12
90th percentile 1,206 992 1,301 0.126 0.108 0.124
10th percentile –1,250 –1,148 –1,552 –0.115 –0.115 –0.139
No. of ﬁrms 3,222 3,350 3,509
Average of SD of change 
in wageb 1,814 1,538 1,983 0.19 0.17 0.19
SD 975 644 865 0.069 0.053 0.061
90th percentile 2,729 2,217 2,990 0.26 0.23 0.27
10th percentile 1,049 922 1,161 0.12 0.11 0.12
No. of ﬁrms 3,219 3,343 3,503
Average of ﬁrm average 
change in wagec 17 –110 –164 0.007 –0.008 –0.012
SD 1,134 981 1,409 0.107 0.097 0.125
90th percentile 1,307 1,036 1,395 0.130 0.109 0.126
10th percentile –1,220 –1,152 –1,551 –0.117 –0.116 –0.140
No. of plants 4,099 4,232 4,204
Average of SD of 
change in wagec 1,806 1,554 1,999 0.187 0.169 0.191
SD 986 668 900 0.068 0.053 0.061
90th percentile 2,801 2,308 3,118 0.262 0.232 0.274
10th percentile 1,034 926 1,160 0.123 0.114 0.124
No. of plants 4,096 4,226 4,195
Average change in wage 
for people who 
change ﬁrmsa 320 148 –77 0.04 0.02 –0.003
SD 3,060 2,626 2,960 0.311 0.26 0.267
90th percentile 3,869 3,119 3,254 0.43 0.34 0.32
10th percentile –3,121 –2,731 –3,273 –0.33 –0.29 –0.32
No. of workers 18,737 10,713 33,302
Average change in wage 
for workers between 
25 and 30a –53 –31 –154 –0.0038 –0.0013 –0.013
SD 2,319 1,952 2,616 0.216 0.201 0.233
90th percentile 2,526 2,261 2,920 0.247 0.241 0.273
10th percentile –2,669 –2,354 –3,149 –0.263 –0.246 –0.292
No. of workers 41,542 42,963 33,349
Average change in wage 
for workers between 
45 and 50a –73 –55 –199 –0.006 –0.003 –0.016SD 2,162 1,822 2,367 0.202 0.183 0.204
90th percentile 2,238 2,033 2,548 0.221 0.213 0.230
10th percentile –2,463 –2,166 –2,773 –0.243 –0.218 –0.249
No. of workers 30,154 30,205 28,742
Average change in wage 
for people with tenure 
 3 yearsa 243 35 48 0.035 0.008 0.010
SD 2,314 1,933 2,490 0.257 0.222 0.250
90th percentile 3,098 2,309 3,070 0.370 0.280 0.320
10th percentile –2,455 –2,269 –2,809 –0.263 –0.260 –0.283
No. of workers 14,712 17,615 34,431
Average change in wage 
for people with tenure 
 3 yearsa –9 –36 –179 –0.002 –0.002 –0.015
SD 2,187 1,869 2,432 0.213 0.192 0.214
90th percentile 2,451 2,141 2,670 0.246 0.227 0.246
10th percentile –2,486 –2,214 –2,898 –0.247 –0.229 –0.265
No. of workers 273,070 272,085 178,334
White-collar workers
Average change in wagea 590 –255 –45 0.041 –0.016 –0.004
SD 862 890 1,257 0.53 0.053 0.700
90th percentile 1,307 436 1,162 0.090 0.030 0.070
10th percentile –27 –805 –943 –0.002 –0.050 –0.060
No. of workers 224,499 242,410 226,755
Average of ﬁrm average 
change in wageb 551 –260 54 0.041 –0.018 0.001
SD 344 320 529 0.021 0.020 0.031
90th percentile 930 66 684 0.064 0.003 0.040
10th percentile 219 –545 –470 0.019 –0.036 –0.031
No. of ﬁrms 1,615 1,955 2,282
Average of SD of 
change in wageb 851 791 1,138 0.056 0.049 0.066
SD 552 514 606 0.027 0.027 0.029
90th percentile 1,509 1,334 1,843 0.090 0.079 0.100
10th percentile 405 335 561 0.030 0.021 0.036
No. of ﬁrms 1,615 1,954 2,280
Average of ﬁrm average 
change in wagec 566 –269 31 0.041 –0.018 –0.0002
SD 316 274 542 0.020 0.017 0.032
90th percentile 934 25 684 0.064 0.001 0.037
10th percentile 252 –544 –480 0.020 –0.036 –0.032
No. of plants 2,204 2,550 2,627
Average of SD of 
change in wagec 752 723 1,075 0.050 0.045 0.062
SD 514 451 602 0.026 0.024 0.029
Table 12.3 (continued)
Change in wages Change in log monthly wages
1974 1982 1990 1974 1982 1990
(continued)90th percentile 1,358 1,239 1,860 0.083 0.076 0.098
10th percentile 361 301 525 0.027 0.019 0.033
No. of plants 2,203 2,546 2,627
Average change in wage 
for people who 
change ﬁrmsa 744 117 342 0.050 0.008 0.02
SD 1,782 1,684 1,737 0.106 0.098 0.097
90th percentile 2,486 1,950 2,330 0.172 0.126 0.140
10th percentile –552 –1,044 –867 –0.032 –0.061 –0.055
No. of workers 9,279 9,192 29,629
Average change in wage 
for workers between 
25 and 30a 834 123 305 0.065 0.008 0.019
SD 761 756 1,225 0.052 0.058 0.082
90th percentile 1,565 832 1,520 0.119 0.067 0.109
10th percentile 250 –378 –597 0.020 –0.033 –0.049
No. of workers 31,183 22,744 24,639
Average change in wage 
for workers between 
45 and 50a 455 –368 –135 0.027 –0.023 –0.010
SD 851 780 1,265 0.042 0.042 0.063
90th percentile 1,060 126 1,036 0.063 0.008 0.054
10th percentile –104 –866 1,006 –0.006 –0.049 –0.058
No. of workers 26,743 29,086 38,044
Average change in wage 
for people with tenure 
 3 yearsa 680 30 246 0.064 0.003 0.017
SD 999 943 1,232 0.085 0.065 0.080
90th percentile 1,617 807 1,438 0.160 0.070 0.110
10th percentile –140 –588 –691 –0.008 –0.044 –0.051
No. of workers 8,639 10,624 33,449
Average change in wage 
for people with tenure 
 3 yearsa 590 –267 –94 0.040 –0.017 –0.008
SD 843 884 1,270 0.050 0.052 0.068
90th percentile 1,294 408 1,118 0.090 0.029 0.064
10th percentile –15 –813 –986 –0.001 –0.048 –0.060
No. of workers 205,773 218,746 165,669
Notes: All values are kroners set to 1990 values. SD   standard deviation. Change in wages is deﬁned as
wage in year t– wage in year t– 1. Change in log monthly wages is deﬁned as log wage in year t– log wage
in year t – 1.
aObservation   a person.
bObservation   a ﬁrm.
cObservation   a plant.
Table 12.3 (continued)
Change in wages Change in log monthly wages
1974 1982 1990 1974 1982 1990therefore, get larger pay increases. But these diﬀerences are not particu-
larly large. The average raise for people with at least three years of tenure
is generally within 2 percentage points of the average raise for people with
less than three years of tenure.
12.5 Worker Mobility
Table 12.4details employee entry and exit patterns. Again, the top panel
provides data for blue-collar workers, and the bottom panel details white-
collar mobility. Both panels include columns for 1974, 1982, and 1990 that
summarize ﬁrms with at least twenty-ﬁve employees and then three col-
umns limiting the sample to ﬁrms with at least 100 employees. The ﬁrst row
of the table shows the declining sample ﬁrm size. The standard deviation of
ﬁrm size is substantial, reﬂecting the fact that there are a number of very
large ﬁrms.
The blue-collar data have 1,402 possible occupations. The typical blue-
collar ﬁrm only has people in ten of these occupations (about twenty for
ﬁrms with 100 or more employees.) As ﬁrm size drops throughout the
sample period, so does the average number of occupations within a ﬁrm.
There are a total of ﬁfty-one white-collar occupation groups and, once the
various levels within each of these groups is added, 285 distinct occupation
classiﬁcations in the white-collar data. The average white-collar ﬁrm in the
data has employees in thirty of these occupations, again dropping as aver-
age ﬁrm size drops. The average larger ﬁrm (100 or more employees) em-
ploys people in about sixty occupations.
The third row of the bottom panel of table 12.4 shows the number of lev-
els (out of a possible seven) of white-collar jobs represented. There is not a
blue-collar equivalent to the white-collar level. There are up to seven levels
within an occupation group. As mentioned earlier, high-level employees in
one occupation may not be comparable (in terms of skill and wages) to high-
level employees in another occupation. So the average number of levels
within a ﬁrm, which can include numerous occupation groups, is at best a
proxy of the number of true “levels” within any given ﬁrm. An average white-
collar ﬁrm has almost four levels, and the average large ﬁrm has almost
four and a half. This suggests that most ﬁrms do not have a full hierarchy
that covers all possible levels. Firms tend to have workers concentrated in
a few levels.
The fourth row of the blue-collar section and the ﬁfth row of the white-
collar section show the exit rate using an individual year as an observation.
In order to be included in this calculation, a ﬁrm had to appear in the data
in the year shown and the previous year. It also had to have at least twenty-
five workers in each of those two years. I deﬁne an exit as a person who is work-
ing in a ﬁrm in year t – 1 but not working at that ﬁrm in year t. The sample
sizes are based on year t– 1, while the employee cutoﬀthat determines if the
Wage Structure and Labor Mobility in Sweden, 1970–90 439Table 12.4 Mobility (no. of ﬁrms)
All ﬁrms Firms with 100  employees
1974 1982 1990 1974 1982 1990
Blue-collar workers
Employees 128.1 111.9 94.8 444.0 448.3 374.9
SD 532.3 511.2 331.9 1090.3 1160.0 745.1
No. of occupations 10.4 9.2 8.3 20.0 19.5 18.8
SD 11.2 10.1 9.7 18.1 17.4 16.9
Employment growth 6.9 –1.9 2.8 8.2 –4.6 –0.1
SD 24.4 37.5 24.7 19.7 13.3 22.8
Exit ratea 14.8 10.7 22.6 14.3 10.3 23.5
No. of observations 265,717 351,132 320,778 204,754 269,992 235,531
Exit rate 16.1 12.1 20.2 15.2 11.8 20.5
SD 11.0 10.9 13.1 9.3 11.7 14.6
No. of ﬁrms 1,777 2,258 2,368 502 587 581
Exit rate, top quartile of ﬁrm wages 10.4 8.1 14.3 9.8 8.1 14.8
SD 12.5 12.3 15.3 10.1 12.6 16.1
Exit rate, bottom quartile of ﬁrm 
wages 25.3 18.9 29.7 24.2 18.3 30.1
SD 16.7 15.9 17.8 12.5 14.0 16.1
Exit rate, top decile of ﬁrm wages 9.9 8.1 14.3 9.5 8.2 14.9
SD 15.8 15.0 19.4 12.1 14.0 17.9
Exit rate, bottom decile of ﬁrm 
wages 29.9 22.7 34.0 29.6 22.2 34.6
SD 22.2 21.2 23.5 15.9 16.5 18.3
Entry rate 19.6 10.7 20.3 20.0 9.6 19.1
SD 12.2 11.8 13.3 11.3 11.1 13.0
Entry rate, top quartile of ﬁrm wages 10.4 7.0 12.4 11.3 6.6 11.9
SD 12.8 12.3 14.7 11.9 11.6 13.7
Entry rate, bottom quartile of ﬁrm 
wages 34.3 16.0 31.0 34.1 14.0 28.3
SD 19.6 16.5 19.7 15.3 13.4 16.2
Entry rate, top decile of ﬁrm wages 9.5 6.6 11.4 10.1 6.5 11.2
SD 15.8 14.6 18.0 13.1 13.0 15.2
Entry rate, bottom decile of ﬁrm 
wages 43.1 18.4 36.2 42.7 16.4 33.2
SD 25.6 21.5 25.4 18.6 16.0 18.1
Percentage of employees who 
switch jobs internally 13.1 12.9 14.0 12.9 13.4 13.6
SD 13.8 19.5 19.9 12.6 19.5 18.4
Percentage of new jobs ﬁlled 
internally 33.0 47.0 31.6 33.1 52.6 34.4
SD 23.2 32.5 26.1 20.2 28.4 24.6
Percentage of workers who have 
been at ﬁrm 3  years 88.3 89.3 72.0 88.3 90.9 73.0
SD 9.1 9.7 13.8 7.9 6.7 12.5
Correlation (exit rate, average wage)b –0.105 –0.052 –0.151 –0.068 –0.049 –0.157
Correlation (exit rate, average wage 
change)b 0.031 –0.030 –0.064 –0.059 –0.021 –0.056
Correlation (exit rate, SD of wage)b 0.059 0.074 –0.017 0.098 0.033 0.014Correlation (entry rate, average 
wage)b –0.094 0.006 –0.048 –0.079 0.062 –0.035
Correlation (entry rate, average 
wage change)b 0.076 0.066 0.058 0.120 0.042 0.127
Correlation (entry rate, SD of wage)b 0.048 0.170 0.080 0.039 0.243 0.151
Exit ratec 0.153 0.116 0.197 0.139 0.106 0.194
SD 0.108 0.108 0.135 0.084 0.103 0.139
No. of plants 2,334 3,040 2,823 596 729 602
Entry ratec 0.186 0.103 0.195 0.187 0.085 0.172
SD 0.120 0.113 0.133 0.104 0.099 0.122
White-collar workers
Employees 157.1 134.1 119.0 455.2 415.0 345.3
SD 477.5 443.0 319.3 846.1 837.4 587.6
No. of occupations 30.2 28.9 25.6 60.7 59.0 49.5
SD 26.3 24.4 20.1 33.4 32.2 26.3
No. of levels 3.8 3.7 3.6 4.4 4.4 4.3
SD 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.7
Employment growth 7.5 –0.2 2.5 9.1 –1.0 –0.2
SD 26.5 16.2 48.3 38.9 13.7 17.0
Exit ratea 10.1 9.6 18.6 9.3 9.3 19.4
No. of observations 252,633 272,599 279,620 200,487 210,398 206,276
Exit rate 12.5 10.6 16.9 11.0 10.6 17.7
SD 10.4 11.6 14.6 8.8 12.0 17.2
No. of ﬁrms 1,540 1,814 2,105 436 492 570
Exit rate, top quartile of ﬁrm wages 9.7 10.0 15.4 8.4 10.2 16.6
SD 12.2 13.6 17.0 9.0 12.4 18.4
Exit rate, bottom quartile of ﬁrm 
wages 18.6 13.1 20.8 17.0 12.5 21.6
SD 15.1 15.0 17.7 11.3 13.0 17.6
Exit rate, top decile of ﬁrm wages 10.4 11.0 16.2 9.4 11.1 17.7
SD 15.9 16.9 20.9 10.3 13.8 19.9
Exit rate, bottom decile of ﬁrm wages 23.1 15.4 23.6 21.2 14.6 24.1
SD 20.7 19.5 22.2 13.3 14.9 18.7
Entry rate 15.3 9.7 17.1 14.8 9.5 15.6
SD 10.7 10.6 13.7 10.9 11.1 13.6
Entry rate, top quartile of ﬁrm wages 7.6 7.3 12.4 7.5 7.3 11.5
SD 11.4 11.4 14.9 11.0 11.4 14.0
Entry rate, bottom quartile of ﬁrm 
wages 29.4 14.6 24.6 29.0 14.3 22.8
SD 17.7 15.7 19.0 15.0 13.5 16.9
Entry rate, top decile of ﬁrm wages 7.5 7.4 12.7 7.6 8.0 11.7
SD 14.0 13.6 18.2 11.8 12.8 15.2
Entry rate, bottom decile of ﬁrm 
wages 38.8 17.7 28.9 39.0 17.6 26.8
SD 24.9 21.3 24.5 19.0 16.8 19.9
(continued)
Table 12.4 (continued)
All ﬁrms Firms with 100  employees
1974 1982 1990 1974 1982 1990Percentage of employees who 
switch jobs internally 10.9 8.2 8.4 11.7 9.8 8.9
SD 11.5 9.5 10.7 7.9 7.2 8.5
Percentage of new jobs ﬁlled 
internally 32.9 42.7 27.6 39.2 52.7 34.1
SD 25.1 31.4 24.8 20.1 23.0 21.3
Percentage of workers who have 
been at ﬁrm 3  years 92.4 92.3 73.7 93.4 93.1 75.7
SD 6.8 7.4 12.8 4.7 6.1 11.0
Correlation (exit rate, average wage)b –0.104 0.015 0.008 –0.072 0.095 –0.026
Correlation (exit rate, average wage 
change) 0.026 0.141 0.139 0.067 0.155 0.187
Correlation (exit rate, SD of wage) –0.040 0.012 0.049 –0.015 0.076 0.018
Correlation (entry rate, average 
wage)b –0.159 –0.013 –0.009 –0.231 –0.044 –0.105
Correlation (entry rate, average 
wage change)b 0.098 0.255 0.258 –0.011 0.250 0.213
Correlation (entry rate, SD of wage)b –0.028 0.013 0.010 –0.035 0.007 –0.018
Exit ratec 0.131 0.105 0.173 0.120 0.100 0.177
SD 0.120 0.122 0.154 0.108 0.121 0.171
No. of plants 2,079 2,331 2,393 473 477 492
Entry ratec 0.157 0.097 0.175 0.147 0.093 0.157
SD 0.118 0.111 0.149 0.106 0.117 0.134
Notes: All statistics are calculated at the ﬁrm level, except the ﬁrst exit rate and the plant level statistics
in the last two rows. SD   standard deviation.
aObservations   a person.
bObservations   a ﬁrm.
cObservations   a person.
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ﬁrm has at least 100 employees is based on year t. The exit rate for blue- and
white-collar employees in 1974 was 14.8 percent and 10.1 percent, respec-
tively. This suggests that, though the Swedish labor market is thought to be
fairly stable, about one worker in seven left his or her ﬁrm in 1974. The exit
rate drops to 10.7 percent (blue-collar) and 9.6 percent (white-collar) in
1982 and then jumps to over 22 percent and 18 percent in 1990. The exit
rate is quite similar for the sample with 100 or more employees.
The next row of the table shows that the average ﬁrm-level exit rate (that
is, the average across all ﬁrms of the ﬁrms’ exit rates) is similar to the per-
son-level exit rate. This is to be expected because, given that there is no ap-
parent relationship between exit rates and ﬁrm size, there is no reason to
think weighting by ﬁrm would lead to a diﬀerence relative to weighting by
individuals.
Table 12.4 (continued)
All ﬁrms Firms with 100  employees
1974 1982 1990 1974 1982 1990The standard deviation of ﬁrm exit rate, which is 10 to 11 percent in 1974
and 1982, grows to nearly 13 to 15 percent in 1990. This suggests that many
ﬁrms have exit rates over 20 percent in each year, while some ﬁrms have
very low exit rates. This variation in exit rates can be seen graphically in ﬁg-
ure 12.8, which presents kernel density estimates of ﬁrm-average exit rates
by year for the blue-collar and white-collar samples.
The next several rows of the table examine exit rates within wage groups
at each ﬁrm. Speciﬁcally, I break each ﬁrm into quartiles and deciles by
wage and then look at exit rates in the upper or lower extreme. As one
might expect, exit rates are much higher in the bottom wage quartile
(decile) than in the top quartile (decile). The diﬀerence is particularly stark
in the blue-collar sample, where bottom-quartile exit rates are more than
double top-quartile exit rates. Further, exit is particularly high in the bot-
tom decile, which has a somewhat higher exit rate than the bottom quartile
(of which, obviously, it is a subset.) On the other hand, the top decile does
not have a noticeably diﬀerent exit rate than the top quartile. Two other
things worth noting are that all of these patterns hold both in larger ﬁrms
and the sample as a whole and that turnover increased between 1982 and
1990 for every subgroup.
These results suggest that people in the low part of the wage distribution
have the least to lose by changing jobs and that this relationship gets
stronger all the way to the bottom of the wage distribution within ﬁrms.
However, there appears to be a diﬀerence in the upper end of ﬁrms’ wage
distributions. While high-paid workers are less likely to leave their jobs
than other workers, the very highest-paid workers are no less likely to leave
(and maybe even a bit more likely to leave) than employees who are near,
but not quite at, the top of their ﬁrms’ wage distributions. This is consis-
tent with there being a relatively ﬂuid market for top performers who some-
times have to move ﬁrms to have their talents used eﬃciently.
The drop in exit rates between 1974 and 1982, as well as the increase from
1982 through 1990, are substantial. These two trends were likely driven by
several factors. First, the Swedish economy was recovering from a signiﬁ-
cant recession in 1984, and this may have hindered the opportunity to
change jobs. Second, there was a signiﬁcant increase in the use of tempo-
rary workers in Sweden starting around 1990.5 While the bulk of this in-
crease came after 1990, temporary arrangements likely had a positive eﬀect
on turnover rates in the late 1980s. Third, as wages became more com-
pressed in the 1970s, the gains to be had by switching ﬁrms were reduced.
One of the reasons the centralized bargaining system broke down in 1983
is that ﬁrms had diﬃculty recruiting highly skilled workers. The resulting
decentralized bargaining system led to the less compressed wage system
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5. See Holmlund and Storrie (2002).that can be seen in table 12.2, which led at least some employees to seek out
the new better-paid opportunities.
Finally, the late 1980s and 1990 saw signiﬁcant activity in mergers, ac-
quisitions, and other ownership changes. The SAF data, therefore, show
many people changing “ﬁrms” even when most of their coworkers are un-
changed. These workers have changed jobs in that their employer, as de-
ﬁned as the owner of the business for which they work, has changed even if
their daily job has not. However, for at least two reasons, this seems un-
likely to be a primary driver of the trends in turnover. First, if a ﬁrm is taken
over and all its employees go to work for another ﬁrm, that ﬁrm disappears
from the data and is not included in the turnover calculations. Second, the
kernel density estimates in ﬁgure 12.8 suggest that the increase in turnover
in 1990 was due to a fairly consistent increase in turnover at most ﬁrms
rather than a subset of ﬁrms having a dramatic increase in turnover. Thus,
it appears that the 1990 increase in turnover was widespread, rather than
being concentrated in ﬁrms that merged.
The next several rows of the table measure the average ﬁrm entry rate. An
entry is deﬁned as someone who works in the ﬁrm in year tbut did not work
in the ﬁrm in year t – 1. The sample for this calculation is ﬁrms that are in
the sample in both year t – 1 and year t. The entry rates shown are ﬁrm av-
erages. For example, the 19.6 percent entry rate in 1974 for the blue-collar
sample indicates that 19.6 percent of the 1974 workers at an average ﬁrm
were not employed by the ﬁrm in 1973. Not surprisingly, the entry rate is
similar to the exit rate, though a bit higher as a result of the fact that sur-
viving ﬁrms are, on average, growing.
While the exit and entry rates are quite similar, they are not as similar
when looking at smaller portions of the distribution within ﬁrms. For the
most part, the entry rates are noticeably higher than the exit rates at the
lower end of the distribution and lower at the higher end of the distribu-
tion. This is, again, quite natural. Many of the employees who “enter”
higher-paid jobs do so internally. As a result, the entry rate from outside
the ﬁrm is relatively low for these jobs.
Several rows near the bottom of the table show the correlation between
entry (or exit) and various ﬁrm-level wage variables. It seems reasonable to
expect that ﬁrms with higher pay would have lower exit and entry rates. This
tends to be true, though the results are inconsistent for white-collar work-
ers. For white-collar workers, ﬁrm pay levels and exit rates are negatively
correlated, but the level of correlation is not particularly high. In addition,
for white-collar ﬁrms, those ﬁrms that provide relatively large raises actually
have higher exit rates. This may reﬂect the fact that ﬁrms with the highest
risk of losing workers give relatively large raises. This could make the exit
rate lower than it otherwise would be, though still high at these ﬁrms. The
ﬁnal rows of the table show that entry and exit rates are very similar when
measured at a plant level as at a ﬁrm level. This means that movement
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A
Bbetween plants at the same ﬁrm is not an important part of total movement
between jobs in the Swedish labor market.
In addition to these ﬁndings within each sample, there are some diﬀer-
ences between the top panel blue-collar sample and the bottom panel
white-collar sample. In general, there is more movement (that is, higher en-
try and exit rates) for white-collar workers than for blue collar workers.
Blue-collar workers change jobs somewhat less frequently than white-
collar workers. At least two explanations are consistent with this diﬀer-
ence. First, there may be more competition for relatively skilled workers.
Second, productivity in managerial jobs could be driven more by general
human capital, so the value of long-term relationships between ﬁrms and
workers may be lower.
12.6 Conclusion
Using a matched employer-employee data set, I have shown that the
Swedish labor market underwent fairly dramatic changes during the 1970s
and 1980s. From 1974 through 1982, wages in the already relatively egali-
tarian Swedish labor market became even more compressed. Wage varia-
tion decreased both within ﬁrms and across ﬁrms. However, in 1983, the
highly centralized wage bargaining system that had been in place for sev-
eral decades began to break down. Several unions began to negotiate
wages in a more fragmented manner. As a result of this change (and possi-
bly other changes), Swedish wages became more variable by 1990.
I also showed that, probably due to the bargaining changes, the state of
the Swedish economy, and an increase in merger and acquisition activity in
the late 1980s, job change became less common in Sweden between 1974
and 1982 and then became dramatically more common by 1990. Both the
job turnover and wage compression trends are strong for blue-collar and
white-collar workers.
The analyses in this chapter have been largely descriptive. However, they
suggest numerous potential economic questions that can be posed and an-
swered using the matched employer-employee data set employed here. Fu-
ture work can help determine how diﬀerent Swedish ﬁrms changed their
personnel policies in reaction to changes in the bargaining process, macro-
economic conditions, and increased merger and acquisition activity.
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